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Abstract The calls in 2019 and 2020 for a Royal Commission, combined with the launch of The Strategic Review
by The Police Foundation and the recommendation by Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue
Services for ‘profound and far reaching police reform’, evidence a thirst for refinement, and potentially, significant
change to the governance of policing. Using new empirical data obtained through elite research interviews with
some of the most senior stakeholders in policing at a regional and national level, this article explores the ability of
Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) to hold Chief Constables to account. Attention is drawn to how the
accountability of Chief Constables to PCCs may have significant strengths, such as enhanced visibility, increased fre-
quency, and improved scrutiny. However, the accountability of Chief Constables may also be frustrated and possibly
compromised. Indeed, accountability might be exercised inconsistently, susceptible to significant variance and
contingent on the calibre and vagaries of PCCs. As such, recommendations are made to strengthen governance
arrangements to ensure Chief Constables are robustly held to account. Specifically, the Home Secretary is encour-
aged to review The Policing Protocol Order and issue an Accountability Code of Practice.
Introduction
This article examines the ability of Police and
Crime Commissioners (PCCs) to hold Chief
Constables to account in England and Wales. The
research presented here shows that the account-
ability of Chief Constables to PCCs can have a
number of significant strengths. In particular, visi-
bility, frequency, and improved scrutiny.
However, this research also draws attention to
how the accountability of Chief Constables could
be frustrated, administered inconsistently, and be
of variable quality. Moreover, the accountability of
Chief Constables may be subject to the vagaries of
PCCs, including their variable calibre.
The governance of policing was until 2012 a re-
sponsibility shared between the Home Secretary,
Chief Constables and the relevant Police
Authority. This ‘tripartite structure’ was widely
criticized (Lambert, 1986; Reiner, 1992; The
Scarman Report, 1982; Home Office Report 38/02,
2003). One aspect that attracted particularly strong
criticism was the perceived expanding power of
the Home Secretary and Chief Constables. In add-
ition to highlighting that the Home Secretary was
accountable to Parliament for a police service,
which they had no direct responsibility for (Oliver,
1997), it was argued the tripartite enhanced and
constitutionally extended the powers of the Home
*Lecture in Law, Essex Law School, University of Essex, Wivenhoe Park, Colchester CO4 3SQ, UK. E-mail:
sjcoop@essex.ac.uk
Policing, Volume 00, Number 0, pp. 1–17
doi:10.1093/police/paab012







/policing/advance-article/doi/10.1093/police/paab012/6253137 by guest on 27 April 2021
Secretary and Chief Constables at the expense of
Police Authorities. This led critics to conclude that
the governance arrangements introduced by the
Police Act 1964 created a bipartite structure not a
tripartite (McLaughlin, 2007). The structure was
also considered entirely unbalanced as the Home
Secretary could exert significant pressure on Chief
Constables to direct their resources. Developing
this, some considered the tripartite structure to be
nothing more than a convenient smokescreen for
the Government to retain de facto national control
of the police (Warburton, 2004). The structure
was also considered inherently weak and one that
held no tangible meaning for the public. Indeed,
Police Authorities were argued to discharge their
statutory duty with limited effect, meaning the
views of local people were rarely reflected in the
strategic direction of the police (Oliver, 1997). In
addition, the tripartite structure failed to provide
any form of accountability at a local level and con-
cern expressed that the structure entangled
responsibilities and created uncertain lines of ac-
countability, which made it difficult to call any of
the stakeholders to account (Oliver, 1997).
The frailties of the tripartite structure were
aggravated by the strong and persistent criticisms
directed at Police Authorities, widely considered
the weakest link. Analysts such as Jones, Newburn
and Smith asserted Police Authorities lacked ex-
pertise and were undermined by the Home Office
(Jones et al., 1995). With parity, and conceivably
at the expense of local accountability, Oliver
underlined how the Home Office set the strategic
direction for policing through the use of informal
and bureaucratic Home Office circulars (Oliver,
1997). Police Authorities were also considered in-
herently weak and unable or unwilling to use their
statutory power to hold Chief Constables to ac-
count (Lambert, 1986). Arguably, this was evi-
denced by Chief Constables failing to report
regularly to Police Authorities and a failure of
Police Authorities to use their power to call for
reports from Chief Constables. Equally, Scarman
warned Police Authorities were uncertain of
themselves as they failed to exercise their responsi-
bilities (The Scarman Report, 1982). Further, the
annual reports that Chief Constables were required
to provide to Police Authorities were considered a
very weak form of accountability as no consulta-
tive duty was placed on Chief Constables. As such,
reports were considered informative document
but not a real mechanism that Police Authorities
could use to hold Chief Constables to account.
Ultimately, the failure of Police Authorities led
some to conclude that Chief Constables were vir-
tually autonomous (Lambert, 1986).
A Home Office report published in 2003 heaped
further criticism on Police Authorities. In addition
to finding that the vast majority of the public had
not previously heard of Police Authorities, and
those that had did not know what they were or
what their role was, ‘Public Perceptions of Police
Accountability’ drew attention to the very low
level of democratic dialogue between the policed
and their Police Authority (Home Office Report
38/02, 2003). The Home Office also found the ma-
jority of the public were sceptical as to whether
Police Authorities were effective, largely because of
their low public profile. Moreover, Jones and
Newburn (2006) observed a notable decline in the
popular legitimacy of the police, so crucial to pub-
lic consent and compliance, and others suggested
Police Authorities lacked any form of transparency
and legitimacy (Gravelle and Rogers, 2011).
Supporting this, it was argued that although mem-
bers of Police Authorities were appointed repre-
sentatives the majority were not directly appointed
by the public. Conceivably, this led Police
Authorities to be invisible, which further eroded
the public’s disconnection with the police and
increased the democratic deficit in police
accountability.
The weaknesses of the tripartite structure and
the re-occurring criticisms made of Police
Authorities led to the adoption of ‘calculative and
contractual’ accountability (Reiner and Spencer,
1993) and New Public Management (NPM)
(Jones, 1995; Brain, 2013). In particular, NPM
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intended to make the police more accountable by
ensuring an efficient, economic and effective po-
lice service. These models were utilized by succes-
sive Conservative and Labour administrations in
the 1990’s and injected police governance with pri-
vate sector concepts and structures (McLaughlin,
2007) such as costing concepts, performance
tables, and the externalization of non-essential
responsibilities (Leishman et al., 2000).
Accountability became more consumer focused
via public service agreements, citizen charters, and
the best value audit process (Cane, 2011;
McLaughlin, 2007; Home Office, 2001). As such,
pluralization, centralization, and managerialism
became synonymous with the governance of
policing.
However, these institutionalized performance
frameworks arguably led police accountability to
be driven by Whitehall-defined values and crime
reduction targets. Indeed, ‘calculative and contrac-
tual’ accountability and NPM were widely cri-
tiqued as speculative, unworkable, and ultimately
unsuccessful (Jones, 1995; Loveday, 1999). In the
short term, they were considered to be an assault
on professional cultures and power relations in the
police and in the long term an unprecedented shift
in police governance as they were directed and
controlled by central Government (Reiner, 2010).
These models were also argued to create a gulf be-
tween the public and the police (McLaughlin,
2007). In addition, ‘calculative and contractual’
accountability arguably corrupted the unique
ethos of British policing as the police was con-
verted into a crime-controlling business. Further,
the value for money concepts of NPM conceivably
blurred the distinction between the police and the
private security sector, which led to market-
dictated and crime-orientated business-like polic-
ing (Newburn and Reiner, 2004).
The perceived failure of Police Authorities com-
bined with the criticisms directed at the tripartite
structure and the unsuccessful flirtations with ‘cal-
culative and contractual’accountability and NPM
paved the way for reform. The thrust of these
reforms were that police accountability had to be
decentralized and democratically accountable
(Policy Exchange, 2003, 2007, 2009, 2013). A con-
fluence of policy and political discussion (Speech
by Shadow Home Secretary Oliver Letwin to the
Conservative party conference, 2003; The
Conservative Election Manifesto, 2005; Speech by
Shadow Home Secretary David Davis to the
Conservative party conference, 2004; Lecture by
David Cameron to the Police Foundation, 2006;
Policing for the People, Interim report of the
Police Reform Taskforce, 2007; Speech by Chris
Grayling ‘Our plans for elected police
Commissioners.’, 2009; The Conservative
Manifesto, 2010; Home Office, 2010; HM
Government, 2010) led to the introduction of dir-
ectly elected PCCs in 2012 and the discredited tri-
partite structure disbanded. In short, a new
experimental and transformative era in the gov-
ernance of policing was born.
However, the introduction of PCCs was far
from smooth. From the infamous Channel 4 docu-
mentary ‘Meet the Commissioner’ (‘Meet the
Commissioner’, 2014) to a series of headline grab-
bing clashes with Chief Constables (The Queen on
the Application of Rhodes v Police and Crime
Commissioner for Lincolnshire, 2013; BBC 2012;
Cooper, 2020; Shannon, 2020; BBC 2017a,b, The
Telegraph 2018) to expense revelations, allegations
of cronyism and a number of high-profile dismiss-
als (BBC, 2013; BBC 2016; Statement from South
Yorkshire Police and Crime Commissioner, 2014;
BBC, 2014a,b) PCCs have in their infancy proved
to be contentious and problematic.
Holding chief constables to
account
The Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act
(2011) (PRSRA) and the Policing Protocol Order
(2011) set the accountability responsibilities of
PCCs. The Policing Protocol makes clear that
Chief Constables are accountable to PCCs, stating:
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‘the Chief Constable is accountable to their PCC’
and ‘the accountability of the Chief Constable
remains firmly to the PCC’. In addition, the
Policing Protocol states PCCs have a ‘statutory
duty’ an ‘electoral’ ‘democratic mandate’ and ‘legal
power’ to hold Chief Constables to account.
PCCs are in theory held to account by Police
and Crime Panels (PCPs). PCPs are the committee
or joint committee of relevant local authorities
and a statutory requirement for each police force
area. Therefore, PCPs have a critical role; they are
solely responsible for supporting, scrutinizing,
providing and maintaining a regular ‘check and
balance’ on PCCs. Notably, the Local Government
Association and the Centre for Public Scrutiny
have observed that PCPs are primarily a scrutiny
body created to ‘proactively scrutinise the PCC’
(Local Government Association, 2019). The
National Audit Office has also said that PCPs are
‘the most important check in the accountability
system’ (National Audit Office, 2014).
Yet, given the key role of PCPs, a number of
reports and reviews have questioned their effect-
iveness (The Government response to the
Sixteenth Report from the Home Affairs Select
Committee, 2014; The Committee on Standards in
Public Life, 2015). Various authors (Lister, 2014;
Chambers, 2014; Bailey, 2015; Lister and Rowe
2015; Loveday, 2018) have also questioned the ef-
fectiveness of PCPs, highlighting how PCPs may
lack authority, might have limited power and
could be considered ineffectual.
Some have explored the mechanisms that PCCs
use to hold Chief Constables to account. Of par-
ticular note, and in addition to holding the PCC
model to be structurally defective, The Steven’s
Review argued that PCCs were replacing public
scrutiny and accountability processes with ‘opaque
accountability arrangements’ evidenced by PCCs
meeting privately with Chief Constables (The
Independent Police Commission, 2013). Further,
and whilst recognizing that PCCs were using a
number of different mechanisms to hold Chief
Constables to account, The House of Commons
Home Affairs Select Committee (HASC) expressed
concern that some were inherently weak—in par-
ticular the informal interactions between PCCs
and Chief Constables. Here, the HASC argued that
the mechanisms PCCs use lack transparency and
afforded no ability to scrutinize (The Government
response to the Sixteenth Report from the Home
Affairs Select Committee, 2014).
Finally, and whilst recognizing that PCCs lead
accountability to be more ‘streamlined’ the
Committee on Standards in Public Life (CSPL)
observed that the personal dynamic between PCCs
and Chief Constables could ‘impact on account-
ability’ (The Committee on Standards in Public
Life, 2015).
Given the failings of the tripartite structure, the
criticisms made of ‘calculative and contractual’ ac-
countability, NPM and more recently the scandals
and controversies surrounding PCCs and the res-
ervations expressed at the mechanisms that PCCs
use to hold Chief Constables to account, this study
examined the ability of PCCs to hold Chief
Constables to account. This important question is
explored at a time of challenge, and potentially,
significant change to the governance of policing,
evidenced by the calls in 2019 and 2020 for a Royal
Commission (The Queen’s Speech, 2019; National
Police Chiefs’ Council, 2020; BBC 2019, The
Times 2019), the recommendation by Her
Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary and Fire &
Rescue Services (HMICFRS) for ‘profound and far
reaching police reform’ (HMICFRS, 2018) and the
launch of The Strategic Review of Policing by the
Police Foundation (The Police Foundation, The
Strategic Review of Policing in England and Wales.
(2020)).
Methodology
Interviews with senior officials (Gillham, 2005) at
the ‘top’ of the stratification system (Jupp, 2006)
(defined as ‘elite research interviews’) were con-
ducted with Chief Constables, PCCs and Chairs of
PCPs across five police force areas. Three measures
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were used to select police force areas. Firstly, police
force areas were differentiated as urban or rural.
Secondly, the size of population of the policed
area. Thirdly, whether the PCC was associated
with a political party or whether they were an in-
dependent PCC. Therefore, importantly, five dif-
ferent police force areas were used in this
qualitative study.
In addition to interviews with Chief Constables,
PCCs, and PCPs across five police force areas
interviews were conducted with, a person directly
involved with introducing the present structure of
police accountability and one of the most senior
persons in policing at a national level. Therefore,
in total, 17 interviews were conducted.
Organizations such as the police are generally
considered to be reluctant to grant access to
researchers as they are subject to overwhelming
requests and can sometimes see academic research
as unproductive (Bryman, 1998). An important
part of the successful recruitment procedure for
this study was a personal approach and the identi-
fication of appropriate gatekeepers, defined as
those who can grant or deny access (Warren and
Karner, 2010). Thus, some letters of invitation
were sent directly to contacts made during the
course of this research, while others were recruited
by asking initial interviewees for recommendations
or introductions to specific persons or bodies
within the police force area and beyond: the snow-
ball research approach (Webley, 2010).
All interviews were conducted over a period of
nine months from 2016 to 2017, and each lasted
approximately 90 min. All were carried out face to
face. There were two main benefits to conducting
interviews in person. Firstly, interviewees were
motivated to answer questions, and secondly, the
interviews were more personal (Chatterjee, 2000).
With prior permission, all interviews were audio
recorded.
All interviews were semi-structured (Beamer,
2002) and open questions used with topic areas
identified, but not disclosed to interviewees in ad-
vance. Access to all interviewees was unrestricted,
and no restrictions were placed on the publication
of findings (Burton, 2013).
Because of the sensitive nature of this research,
all interviewees are anonymized with reference to
each policing area by letter. This method of cit-
ation by office and police area was used for all
Chief Constables, PCCs, and PCPs. Data from the
interview with a person directly involved with
introducing the present structure of police ac-
countability will be cited as Person Y, and inter-
view data from one of the most senior persons in
policing will be cited as Person Z. Thus, all inter-
viewees are quoted anonymously, in a gender-
neutral way, and no further information is offered
to avoid identification (Warren and Karner, 2010).
Managing and analysing data had four phases.
Firstly, the manual transcription of data and the
production of verbatim interview transcripts.
Secondly, the identification of core themes using
‘open coding’. Thirdly, the incorporation of core
themes and key quotes onto thematic charts using
the framework analysis method (Ritchie et al.,
2003). Finally, thematic charts were analysed and
themes identified. The author invites further con-
tact for a more detailed breakdown of how raw
interview data were managed and analysed.
This study does not purport to be nationally
representative. However, rigorous analysis of data
produced from in-depth interviews with Chief
Constables, PCCs, and PCPs across different and
systematically selected police force areas provides
important and indicative insights. Moreover,
given the integral influence of Person Y and
Person Z, data produced from these in-depth
interviews make a valuable contribution to this re-
search field.
Can the accountability of chief constables
to PCCs be effective?
This research finds that PCCs can hold Chief
Constables to account effectively. Some Chief
Constables argue that accountability by PCCs has
a number of significant strengths. For example,
Chief Constable A outlined how PCCs have
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increased the visibility of accountability and led
accountability to be more direct, instantaneous,
and continual:
I am grilled, and that’s probably the
best word for it. The simple optic of
the PCC sitting next to me means
accountability is very visible. The ac-
countability is instant, direct, visible
and quite personable . . . it’s a more
continual, rolling accountability
(with) a higher level of scrutiny and a
greater level of detail, a greater level
of understanding because of the way
that the organizations now work to-
gether getting that oversight right.
Fundamentally, the PCC provides a
quicker, slicker, more straight for-
ward process. (Chief Constable A)
The argument that PCCs can lead the account-
ability of Chief Constables to be more frequent
was also evident from a number of interviews with
PCCs. For example, PCC D highlighted how ac-
countability is now on-ongoing:
Police Authorities were wrapped
around the little fingers of Chief
Constables because they never really
knew what was going on . . . Chief
Constables were barely accountable to
their Police Authorities, it was lip ser-
vice . . . it was always Chief
Constables that were always the Kings
of their Kingdom. Every Chief
Constable was the King in their
Kingdom. Locally Chief Constables
could do what the hell they liked and
boy did they do it! We are in the or-
ganization all the time, accountability
is on an on-going basis. (PCC D)
The increased frequency of accountability
was also highlighted by PCC E. This
interviewee asserted that PCCs have removed
the constant backlog associated with Police
Authorities, leading accountability to be instant
and more robust:
It (accountability) is instant, with rec-
ognition of difficulties or successes
whereas with the Police Authority it
was a constant backlog. Chief
Constables are held more robustly to
account because there is just one per-
son steeped in it. (PCC E)
The removal of the backlog highlighted by PCC
E was also acknowledged by Chief Constable C,
contending that PCCs can be accessible and can
provide a more effective means of decision making
compared with their predecessor, Police
Authorities:
Police Authorities were a blinking
nightmare to get a decision . . . where-
as with PCCs you do get a decision.
The relationship I have with my PCC
is a good relationship where we can
have access to each other whenever we
need too. (Chief Constable C)
This argument was also made by Chief
Constable D, emphasizing that the single point of
decision making that PCCs can bring to the gov-
ernance and accountability of policing can also
provide an effective platform for policing. With a
significant caveat, it was also argued that PCCs do
have the ability to constantly question, continually
challenge and therefore hold Chief Constables to
account effectively. Indeed, this research respond-
ent highlighted that PCCs can be more open,
engaging, and challenging of Chief Constables:
The good thing with the PCC is that
single point of decision making
allows me to not have to convince
sixteen politicians from different
backgrounds. I have a single point of
contact to explain the context of
what is going on, the challenges, the
opportunities that exist. That has
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provided a more dynamic environ-
ment for us to try and move policing
forward. I am saying it’s a positive
model because I have had a value
driven, bright public service individ-
ual. My colleagues don’t all have the
same experience. In (this police area)
someone has come in from outside
policing with a history of operating
in the private sector at a strategic
level and therefore questions that
have been asked have been robustly
put. However, not all PCCs are as
bright and as well informed as (my
PCC). I think the other really valid
role from an engaged thoughtful PCC
like I have is because (the PCC) is
constantly asking questions, constant-
ly challenging, constantly checking
there have been occasions where (the
PCC) has provided me with another
set of lenses or another view which I
might not have had otherwise. (The
PCC) has challenged me on a range
of positions and that has constantly
pushed the quality of what we are
doing. For me that is exactly what
meaningful scrutiny is, not some
cheap headline or posturing in a
newspaper. At their best PCCs have
presented a more open way of engag-
ing, challenging and holding to ac-
count Chief Constables. (Chief
Constable D)
In addition to identifying that PCCs can lead to the
accountability of Chief Constables to be more fre-
quent, instantaneous, and visible, this research also
finds efficiency to be an additional strength. While
stressing that the model was not ‘always perfect’,
Chief Constable A considered accountability to be
more efficient as ‘the current model is a much quicker
way of doing things’. The accountability of Chief
Constables was also asserted to be more efficient by a
number of PCCs. For example, PCC C considered ac-
countability to be more effective and more transpar-
ent while also providing greater clarity:
It (the accountability of Chief
Constables) has improved a huge
amount. In the past you had the
Chief Constable as King or Queen of
all they surveyed . . . who actually
held the Chief Constable to account
beforehand? I’m not sure anybody
did really. Police Authorities were
hardly effective. The Police can make
much quicker decisions. It’s open and
transparent, you go to one person. It
provides much greater clarity. It (ac-
countability) is less bureaucratic, it
(accountability) is much more effi-
cient. (PCC C)
The argument that PCCs can provide greater
clarity was also made by PCC A. In addition, this
research respondent highlighted how the PCC
structure can improve dialogue within the
branches of police governance:
What we have achieved through this
model is much greater clarity about
who is responsible for what, where
the buck stops and specific decisions
. . . it promotes, if you get it right, a
better dialogue. (PCC A)
Robustness was identified as a further strength.
For example, PCC E argued that PCCs can lead to
Chief Constables being held to account more
robustly:
There is just one person steeped in it
. . . Chief Constables are held more
robustly to account. (PCC E)
This argument was also acknowledged by Chief
Constable D, highlighting that when PCCs are ef-
fective they can establish a new found grip on
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policing, which, in turn, could lead accountability
to be more effective:
In terms of grip and understanding
of the details going on in a force, it’s
a significant step forward. I guarantee
that my PCC has a far deeper under-
standing of what this force is dealing
with in countering and falling short
on than any Police Authority. (Chief
Constable D)
The argument that PCCs can provide qualities
that would have been inconceivable for Police
Authorities was further highlighted by Chief
Constable A, emphasizing that when PCCs are ef-
fective, they can provide an efficacious and pro-
ductive ‘grip’ that would have been near
impossible for Police Authorities to achieve:
(The PCC) knows more about the
budget and how the organization
works than the Police Authority ever
did. (The PCC) has that level of grip
in a way that would have been very
hard for a Police Authority to do.
(Chief Constable A)
Some PCCs stated that Chief Constables are un-
questionably held to account effectively and others
argued that PCCs have led to difficult and chal-
lenging questions being asked:
There are certain questions that we have
now established and sometimes they are
quite difficult questions for (the Chief
Constable) to answer. (PCC A)
With no hesitation PCC D asserted that PCCs
have improved the accountability of Chief
Constables, highlighting that Chief Constables are
effectively held to account through questioning
and the ever-present threat of PCCs having the
statutory power to dismiss Chief Constables:
Undoubtedly there is more account-
ability now than there was before.
Chief Constables were barely account-
able to their Police Authorities, it was
lip service. Chief Constables are week
by week, month by month being
asked hard questions. That’s what ac-
countability is. Some Chief
Constables have been sacked and
rightly so and others have been put
under the cosh, accountability is
more biting. (PCC D)
This research finds evidence that PCCs can hold
Chief Constables to account effectively. Indeed, ac-
countability driven by PCCs may have a number
of significant strengths. In addition to being trans-
parent and visible, the accountability of Chief
Constables may no longer be sporadic as PCCs can
hold Chief Constables to account on an ongoing
basis. The accountability of Chief Constables is
also highlighted by this research to be instant with
recognition of difficulties and successes. Therefore,
the bureaucratic backlog that haunted account-
ability through the medium of Police Authorities
has conceivably eased as PCCs can provide direct
and accessible decision making, which can bring
greater clarity and improved efficiency. This re-
search also finds that PCCs can provide a contin-
ual check on Chief Constables.
As highlighted above, the inherent weakness
and inability of Police Authorities led some to
conclude that Chief Constables were virtually au-
tonomous. This research indicates that PCCs can
make Chief Constables accountable as they can be
continually asked difficult and challenging ques-
tions that require Chief Constables to explain or
justify action or inaction. In addition to evidenc-
ing the exercise of accountability’s soft mechanism
(Malleson, 1999), as well as its traditional meaning
of answerability (Onions, 1966; Day and Klein,
1987; Schlenker et al.,1994; Chan, 1999; Sengupta,
2014), PCCs conceivably have the ability to ordin-
arily ask Chief Constables difficult questions on a
rolling basis which can lead accountability to be
instantaneous. As such, the responsibilities set by
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The Policing Protocol appear achievable as Chief
Constables can be made answerable as accounts
and explanations are given to PCCs. Therefore, the
requirements of the Protocol can be adhered to as
PCCs can provide robust challenge.
Has the accountability of chief constables
weakened?
This research also finds that the accountability of
Chief Constables to PCCs could be subject to a sig-
nificant anomaly; namely, it might be predisposed
by the relationship between Chief Constables and
PCCs. In turn, this may lead accountability to be
inconsistently administered and subject to signifi-
cant variance. The accountability of Chief
Constables could also be contingent on the calibre
of PCCs, subject to their vagaries and hinge on
luck. Therefore, not only might the duties set by
The Policing Protocol be unfulfilled in some police
areas, the accountability of Chief Constables could
also be impaired. These important developments
are now considered.
Person Z highlighted that current governance
arrangements have potentially created inconsisten-
ces that could impact how effectively Chief
Constables are held to account. The cause was
argued to be the strength or weakness of the PCC.
More broadly, it was suggested that prior to their
introduction PCCs lacked sufficient examination
and with reflection may even be ‘a blunder’:
For one person, even though they are
elected, to replace the wisdom and
contribution of 19 (Police Authority
members) is a tall ask. There’s only
one person (the PCC) providing
scrutiny (of Chief Constables) and
that’s a heavy responsibility, so in
terms of scrutiny of course it’s a lot
less. Palpably has it worked? No. In
the absence of stress testing, thinking
it through, why do we want this,
what’s the problem we are trying to
solve I suspect PCCs might, in
hindsight, be regarded as a blunder.
(Person Z)
Some Chief Constables were candid in their as-
sessment of accountability from PCCs. For ex-
ample, Chief Constable B highlighted that the
reality is that they are not facing a thorough
examination:
Am I facing difficult questions from
the PCC on a daily basis? Absolutely
not. (Chief Constable B)
While contending that PCCs are likely to be
considered more transparent for the public, Chief
Constable E expressed concern that there is likely
to be no, or very limited, additional accountability
of Chief Constables:
Do I feel more held to account than I
did to a Police Authority before? No.
Do I feel it’s a little better and more
transparent with the public? Yes.
(Chief Constable E)
This was acknowledged by others. For
example, PCC D gave a frank assessment,
warning that some PCCs are ‘completely useless’
and likely subject to ‘lip service’ from Chief
Constables:
I know there are some completely use-
less Police and Crime Commissioners.
There are some PCCs that I absolutely
wouldn’t go and work for. The ques-
tion is, can a PCC be played by a
Chief Constable? They clearly could be
and some I suspect are. I am quite
sure that there are some Chief
Constables who just play lip service to
their PCC. (PCC D)
A number of Chief Constables also asserted that
the relationship between Chief Constables and
PCCs could be administered inconsistently. While
some strengths were identified, the risks PCCs
bring to the accountability of Chief Constables
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conceivably dominate and may even overshadow
the governance of policing:
Whilst it brings clarity, it brings timeli-
ness, it reduces political infighting
there is a significant risk that the rela-
tionship either becomes excessively
hostile, excessively friendly or because
of the weaknesses between the two,
particularly where one has been
selected by the other, there isn’t the
balance, additional questioning or
informing of the debate that a wider
group would give. When it is operat-
ing at its pure best it has brought clar-
ity about the ‘one to one’ eye to eye,
explain where we are, why are we
here, what are we doing, what is the
plan but because of poor safeguards
and governance arrangements it too
quickly descends into personalities and
subjectivity in which accountability
becomes likeability, becomes re-
electability. Accountability becomes all
of those things it shouldn’t. (Chief
Constable D)
This research respondent also highlighted that
while their relationship with their PCC was condu-
cive to them being held to account effectively, this
was not a true reflection across police areas:
The relationship I have is a strong
one, it is one based in mutual profes-
sional courtesy and respect. It is one
based on an understanding on both
sides and a distinction between our
roles. There is strong accountability
process in place. I have a value
driven, bright public service individ-
ual. My colleagues don’t all have the
same experience and it concerns me
enormously. I don’t think all the
PCCs are as bright and as well
informed as mine. It is crucial that
we do find a model that properly
challenges and holds Chiefs’ to ac-
count because that drives better
policing. In my County policing is
better because of the arrival of PCCs
but that’s not true in every County
across the Country and what we
should have is a set of governance
arrangements that ensures policing is
improved and that it is robustly held
to account. (Chief Constable D)
These inconsistencies and concerns were rein-
forced by other key informants. For example,
Chief Constable C highlighted that some PCCs are
incompetent and lack basic skill. It was also
observed that some Chief Constables can be ob-
structive to PCCs and some Chief Constables have
failed to adapt to the PCC model:
I have seen evidence of PCCs who
are ill equipped and ill prepared and
actually don’t have the skills to
understand big organizations making
sweeping statements and making
assumptions about individuals with-
out any basis what so ever. I have
also seen Chief Constables that do
not want to adapt to a new way of
working and will be very obstructive
towards PCCs. Chief Constables that
have failed to adapt have lost it com-
pletely. (Chief Constable C)
Others questioned the inherent abilities of some
PCCs. Indeed, it was suggested that some operate
with the driving force of personality and ego:
There are a lot of PCCs out there
that operate on the subjective, the
personality, the ego rather than ob-
jectivity, the clarity, the best evidence
base. (Chief Constable D)
Equally, Chief Constable E outlined how per-
sonalities can become destructive, which, in turn,
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may have a detrimental impact on the accountabil-
ity of Chief Constables:
I know in other areas that individual
egos have got in the way of truly
being accountable. (Chief Constable
E)
A number of PCCs also noted how luck was
critical to success. For example, PCC D considered
it to be essential:
I was lucky and it’s a major factor . . .
I think the Chief (Constable) does
genuinely feel that he is being held to
account to me. Some of my staff
would say am I sure but I am sure
because it’s not quite as apparent to
them as they don’t see the fisty (sic)
cuffs, the stand ups. (PCC D)
With parity, PCC E acknowledged that luck was
a key facet of the relationship between PCCs and
Chief Constables:
I was very lucky when I became PCC
as right at the beginning my existing
Chief Constable left and he was one
of the old School. He kept the Police
Authority at arm’s length, when I be-
came PCC (the Chief Constable) kept
me at arm’s length. There wasn’t a
battle but it wasn’t a marriage made
in heaven. (PCC E)
These findings also signal that the PCC model
can risk a lack of moderating thought, individual-
ism, limited scrutiny and a possible dilution of
accountability:
The overall weakness with one elected
representative (the PCC) is that there
is no moderation of thought. With a
Police Authority you had a Chair and
if they had a particular view or may
have got anxy (sic) over something
you always had a group of people
who would sit down and discuss and
provoke discussion. It would moder-
ate the thought. Now you have one
individual who has no moderation
apart from perhaps their own staff
and may go out on a particular
course of action without having the
additional value of having colleagues
discussing what the implications of a
particular decision may be. (Chief
Constable C)
The frailties of the relationship between PCCs
and Chief Constables were also noted by Chief
Constable E, highlighting that PCCs can risk nar-
rowness of single thought:
The former Chief Constable put up
every barrier they could. The PCC
battled against the barrier. Ninety
percent of my job at the time as then
Deputy Chief Constable was to wade
through the politics of them rowing
all of the time. The PCC hasn’t got a
pool of different views, there is risk
of individualism and single thinking.
(Chief Constable E)
Further, PCC A acknowledged that PCCs might
dilute accountability. Moreover, it was hinted that
the strengths PCCs bring to the accountability of
Chief Constables are likely illusionary:
People like it because they know who
is in charge and who is responsible.
Thoughtful people find it implausible
because what you are expecting one
person (the PCC) to do is to embody
in themselves the oversight of far too
much and therefore in some ways it
is less accountable because that per-
son is going to need advisors,
thoughts, ideas and inputs which are
not always sensible. If you take the
old system you see people wrestling
with a paper, with single person
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accountability structures you see the
decision that one person has taken.
Presumably if it’s something they
didn’t know a lot about they talk to a
lot of people about it but you don’t
see any of those conversations played
out. (PCC A)
It was also highlighted that PCCs may result in
less scrutiny of Chief Constables compared with
Police Authorities. Further, PCC E observed that
some PCCs might limit their potential as they may
be conscious that they themselves could be subject
to damning and persistent criticism:
We have gained in terms of visibility
but lost in terms of detailed scrutiny
that the Police Authority was capable
of. PCCs are not able to get in to the
depth of detail required to be that
check and balance, they can’t do the
scrutiny in depth that the old Police
Authority could do. You’ve lost a bit
of the check and balance. You will
find a lot of Police and Crime
Commissioners haven’t done very
much actually, if you put your head
above the parapet and you do new
things and sometimes they don’t
work you get coconuts thrown at you
but that shouldn’t stop you! (PCC E)
The Policing Protocol could not be clearer, stat-
ing Chief Constables are accountable to PCCs.
Therefore, at first sight, the accountability of Chief
Constables appears to be straight forward.
However, a closer analysis reveals a mixed picture.
While this research shows that the accountability
of Chief Constables to PCCs can have a number of
significant strengths, the findings reported here
also draw attention to how the introduction of
PCCs could have led the accountability of Chief
Constables to be diminished. Indeed, the advent of
PCCs may have resulted in less scrutiny and
reduced the accountability of Chief Constables.
While PCCs may have improved transparency
and visibility, some Chief Constables signal that
they are not facing difficult questions and high-
light that the reality is that PCCs offer limited ac-
countability. Further, the accountability of Chief
Constables may be administered without uniform-
ity and likely subject to significant variance across
police areas. Therefore, in practice, the account-
ability of Chief Constables may be contingent on
the inherent abilities of PCCs. Seemingly, it could
also be exercised inconsistently and with uncer-
tainty meaning there is a real possibility that some
Chief Constables could be held to account more
effectively than others.
Appositely, the exercise of accountability may
be subject to the vagaries of PCCs, contingent on
their calibre and conditional on luck. Moreover,
the accountability of Chief Constables is possibly
subject to PCCs and Chief Constables exercising
their responsibilities effectively. As such, a caveat
of current governance arrangements might be that
the responsibilities of Chief Constables and PCCs
be bonded and exercised in equilibrium for ac-
countability to be effective. As such, if there is a
disconnect between PCCs and Chief Constables,
accountability could be rendered less effective.
Reinforcing these concerns, it appears that some
PCCs can in reality be manipulated and some are
given lip service by Chief Constables. In addition,
some PCCs are argued to be ill equipped, ill pre-
pared and potentially operate with the driving
force of personality and ego. The PCC structure is
claimed by some research respondents to risk indi-
vidualism and potentially a dilution of account-
ability. Here, it is argued to be both unrealistic and
unlikely that a single PCC can embody all of the
oversight and accountability responsibilities envis-
aged by the PRSRA and Policing Protocol. More
broadly, perhaps concerningly, this research high-
lights that some Chief Constables may actively re-
sist PCCs and poor safeguards could overshadow
current governance arrangements. In turn, this
could cause accountability to precariously degen-
erate into entirely uncharacteristic and
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unchartered principles and standards. At the
extremities, it was also suggested that PCCs were
introduced without thorough testing, with limited
thought and with contemplation may even be con-
sidered a mistake.
These important findings could serve as an in-
flection point for the governance of policing. As
such, further research needs to test whether the
findings of this limited study are indeed matters of
general concern. This call is both timely and neces-
sary as the governance of policing is on the verge
of significant change—evidenced by the calls in
2019 and 2020 for a Royal Commission, the
launch of The Strategic Review by the Police
Foundation and HMICFRS’s recommendation for
‘profound and far reaching police reform’. The
findings reported here could feed into the second
phase of the Police Foundation’s review, due to re-
port October 2021. In particular, the strands will
explore how policing should be organized, gov-
erned and held to account.
Even if current governance arrangements are
not a transient construction, this research encour-
ages the Home Secretary to exercise their power
and urgently review The Policing Protocol Order.
The Protocol’s current overly broad, presumption
based, loosely worded and generic approach to the
accountability of Chief Constables needs refine-
ment. The Protocol needs to be clearer and more
direct and its working principles need clarity.
Simply stating ‘the Chief Constable is accountable
to their PCC’ is insufficient, especially at a time
when there is an ever-increasing pressure for ac-
countability (The Police Foundation, Public Safety
and Security in the 21st Century, 2020).
In addition to the Home Secretary’s recently
launched review that will consider the relationship
between PCCs and Chief Constables and examine
how PCCs can deliver consistently across the
Country (Patel, 2020), this research recommends
that the Home Secretary consults the parties
bound by the Policing Protocol and issue an
Accountability Code of Practice to ensure best
practice. This Code needs to set out clearer terms
of reference and give accessible and detailed exam-
ples of mechanisms that PCCs can use to hold
Chief Constables to account. Further, a more
hands-on approach by the Home Office is recom-
mended. However, as noted by the Policing
Protocol, any intervention or direction by the
Home Office must not ‘interfere with the demo-
cratic will of the electorate’. Accordingly, a delicate
and likely difficult balance needs to be struck to
ensure that there is no retreat from the localizing
direct democracy agenda that underpinned the
introduction of PCCs in 2012 (Carswell and
Hannan, 2005; Cabinet Office, 2010; The
Conservative Manifesto, 2010; HM Government,
2010; HM Treasury, 2010). Indeed, this pro-
gramme looks set to expand with the Local
Recovery and Devolution White Paper due for
publication in Autumn 2021.
Far from threatening the PCC model, these rec-
ommendations should be viewed as a means to
improve the working relationships prescribed by
the Policing Protocol and as a way to strengthen
the accountability of Chief Constables. Finally,
these recommendations could be of particular
relevance to the Home Secretary’s forthcoming re-
view and the proposed Accountability Code of
Practice could benefit the new cohort of PCCs that
take office May 2021.
Conclusions
This research shows that PCCs can bring a number
of significant strengths to the accountability of
Chief Constables. However, some concerning
imperfections are also raised. As such, PCCs may
bring some dislocated expectations that could
compromise accountability. Therefore, changes to
current governance arrangements may be
unavoidable.
The profound failings of ‘calculative and con-
tractual’ accountability and NPM demonstrate
why it is vital to avoid ‘knee jerk’ reactions and
ensure that any reform or adjustment to the gov-
ernance of policing is carefully examined. The
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recommendations made by this research aim to
correct the unpredicted changes that PCCs might
inadvertently bring to the accountability of Chief
Constables. Working with these dislocated
expectations is important in the light of the
Home Secretary’s announcement in July 2020
that there are currently no plans to dissolve the
PCC model.
Nonetheless, this research recommends that the
Home Secretary consults the parties bound by the
Policing Protocol and review its suitability. The
Protocol is the statutory foundation of the rela-
tionship between PCCs and Chief Constables, yet
the findings reported here show change is needed.
The Protocol’s working principles need refinement
and greater clarity is essential. Therefore, the
Home Secretary should, in accordance with her
statutory duty, consider whether the Protocol
needs to be varied or replaced.
This research also calls on the Home Secretary
to issue an Accountability Code of Practice. This
Code needs to be accessible and it must set out
clear terms of reference, highlight cases of best
practice and give examples of mechanisms that
PCCs should use to hold Chief Constables to ac-
count. Importantly, this new Code must apply to
all PCCs in England and Wales to ensure that
Chief Constables are held to account consistently.
This research and these recommendations could
feed into the second phase of The Police
Foundation’s Review. Further, the recommended
Code of Practice could support the new cohort of
PCCs that take office May 2021. The need for ac-
countability is growing, and these recommenda-
tions aim to improve working relationships and
strengthen the accountability of Chief Constables.
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